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Product Liability: An
Interaction of Law and Technologyt
Alvin S. Weinstein*
Aaron D. Twerski**
Henry R. Piehler***
William A. Donaher****
INTRODUCTION
In 1970 the President's Commission on Product Safety chronicled a
set of shocking statistics. Some 20 million Americans are injured each
year as a result of incidents connected with consumer products.' Inci-
dents connected with industrial products account for an additional 7
million injuries each year.2 Personal injuries are the primary source of
the burgeoning number of product liability cases entering our courts.
t This article has resulted from a study sponsored by the National Science Foundation
under a grant (NSF Grant No. GI-34857) to Carnegie-Mellon University. The Law School
of Duquesne University participated through the efforts of the two members of that
faculty (Twerski and Donaher) who were members of the study team. The research under-
lying these results was conducted by the authors, the co-principal investigators for the
study.
* B.S., University of Michigan, 1951; M.S., Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1953;
Ph.D., Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1955; Professor of Mechanical Engineering and
Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University.
00 A.B., Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute, 1962; B.S., University of Wisconsin,
1970; J.D., Marquette Law School, 1965; Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of
Law.
000 S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960; S.M., Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, 1962; Sc.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967; Associate
Professor of Metallurgy, Materials Science and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University.
0**0 A.B., Catholic University of America, 1949; LL.B., Harvard University, 1952;
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRoDucr SAFETY (June, 1970),
Lui. CONG. No. 76-600753.
2. THE PREsIDENT's REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (May, 1972).
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In 1969 approximately 300,000 such cases were filed, a threefold increase
over 1968. The number of product liability litigations will inevitably
continue to escalate, spurred primarily by the public's increased aware-
ness of the potential defects in consumer products and industrial
machinery.
The explosion of product liability litigation has thrust the technolo-
gist into a position of preeminence in the judicial decision-making
process. His role in product liability litigation is pivotal. The technical
expert is uniquely qualified to extract from the complex facts, conclu-
sions and opinions which pose the crucial questions for jury determina-
tion. Yet, strangely enough, the role of the technologist and the
interaction of law and technology in product liability litigation have
essentially been unexamined. 3
Plaintiff and defense groups have written trial technique materials
which develop the "how to do it" approach in some depth.4 However,
the most serious shortcoming of these works is that they assume the
basic validity of the system within which they work. Thus, the numerous
monographs available on how best to elicit the testimony of an expert
witness serve only to sharpen the skills of the lawyer who must utilize
the technical expert. They do not confront the question of the proper
role of the expert: to what extent do his biases and predispositions affect
the outcome of the lawsuit? Do fundamental semantic barriers exist be-
tween the technologist's language and that of a court of law? To what
extent is the expert hampered by the quality and quantity of the techni-
cal data made available to him? Is the entire litigation process indeed
designed to bring forth a clear and cogent technological view of
the problem which must be resolved?5 These questions prompted the
3. Cf. De Parcq, Law, Science and the Expert, 24 TENN. L. REv. 166 (1956); Louisell &
Diamond, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63
MicHa. L. Rav. 1330 (1964). While there is extensive literature dealing with various aspects
of the law-technology interface, the focuses have not been on the critical nature of the
establishment of the defect-causation link in strict-liability litigations. See Korn, Law, Fact
and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080 (1966) [hereinafter cited- as Korn], for an
interesting exploration of the roles of the expert and his interactions with the legal system.
4. Many articles have been written, detailing for the trial attorney various practical
techniques for optimal utilization of expert testimony within a products liability trial.
See generally Hammon, The Lawyer and the Expert, 54 A.B.A.J. 583 (1968); Johnson, How
to Try Products Liability Cases, 17 Wyo. L.J. 111 (1963); Meyer, Some Problems Concerning
Expert Witnesses, 42 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 317 (1967); Panel, Trial Tactics in Handling Expert
Witnesses, 29 TENN. L. REv. 208 (1961). Also see generally DEFENSE LAW JOURNAL, under the
topic heading Products Liability. Ashe, So You're Going to Try a Products Liability Case,
13 HAmsrNcs L.J. 66 (1961), is an excellent and thorough introduction to the mechanics of
products litigation for practicing attorneys.
5. An incisive study by Professor Korn resulting from his work as Research Director of
the Armstrong Project raises many of these questions with regard to the generic problems of
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authors to undertake this study, "Product Liability: A Study of the
Interaction of Law and Technology," under the auspices of the National
Science Foundation's Division of Exploratory Research in its program
Research Applied to National Needs (RANN).
To undertake this interdisciplinary study at a substantive level, a
team of four, consisting of two lawyers and two engineers examined and
evaluated each other's problem-solving methodologies. The vehicle for
this examination was transcripts of well-litigated products liability
trials. The choice of trial transcripts containing complex expert testi-
mony permitted the research team to test the validity of the products
trial against established legal criteria.
In order to appreciate the methodology we evolved, it seems in order
to first set forth the basic elements of a products liability suit. To estab-
lish a prima facie products liability case, the plaintiff must prove that:
(a) the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous;
(b) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's
hands;
(c) the defect caused the harm; and
(d) this harm is appropriately assignable to the identified defect.7
These essential elements, as adduced by the facts brought out in the
trial, were distilled according to the following outline:
A. Case Characterization
1. Product Description
The product is described and discussed in the context of its
function, use, safety and cost.
2. Accident Description
The specific accident is narrated.
3. Defect Description
The defect, as identified by the plaintiff, is described with
respect to the integrity, function, safety and use of the product.
4. Description of the Unreasonably Dangerous Nature of the
Product
expert testimony. We have addressed ourselves to these questions in the specific area of
products liability litigation with a primary concern for the role of the technologist in
device-oriented situations. See Korn, supra note 3.
6. Wherever possible, the study included the physical evidence, interrogatories, experts'
reports, depositions and exhibits. In some instances we were able to accomplish independent
testing.
7. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OFTORTS (4th ed. 1971); Wade, Strict Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
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a. Alternatives to reduce danger
b. Probability and gravity of the harm
5. Causal Relationship Between the Defect and the Resulting
Harm
6. Whether this Harm is Appropriately Assignable to this Defect
B. Critical Analysis of Each of the Above Elements
C. Conclusions
The six elements listed above under the general title of Case Charac-
terization must all be addressed in some way in any product liability
litigation. A distillation of the evidence that actually appeared in the
trial in support of each area was recorded under these headings in a neu-
tral, narrative fashion.
In the critical analysis, the authors established, with admitted subjec-
tivity, the quality, comprehensiveness and, to some extent, the validity
of the evidence, as well as of the experts' opinions. Having accomplished
this evaluation, a determination was made as to whether the evidence,
including expert testimony, adequately addressed the legal criteria req-
uisite to adjudicating issues on the proper bases.
A unique feature of this critical evaluation is that we sought to exam-
ine not only whether the technological evidence met the legal criteria
realistically but also whether the technological evaluation was consistent
with the problem-solving methodology of technology. The result of
these parallel investigations led to the identification of serious litigation
problems which appear to require a reexamination of many of the basic
premises of litigation in the products liability area.
The detailed documentation of a representative number of cases can
be found in the Appendix to this article. An in-depth understanding of
the analysis presented here can only be gained from a careful reading of
the Appendix.
STRICT LIABILITY-WHAT IS IT?
In order to prevail under strict liability8 a plaintiff must prove that
the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, that the defect
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS I 402A (1966):
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product
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existed when it left the hands of defendant, and that the defect caused
the harm. What is an unreasonably dangerous product? A product is
after all an object, a thing. How does it become unreasonably dangerous?
Perhaps it is important to stress the obvious at this juncture. In deciding
whether or not a product is or is not unreasonably dangerous the focus
is on the product and not on the conduct of the manufacturer. The shift
from negligence to strict liability requires, if nothing else, that the in-
quiry be focused on the product and the use of the product and away
from what the manufacturer should or should not have done or fore-
seen.9 In order to develop the issue of unreasonable danger it becomes
crucial to understand not only the scope of consumer expectations but
also the entire milieu of product use-the total environment in which
the product finds itself. Understanding the concept of unreasonable
danger is crucial to the trial of both design and production defect cases.
While it may be more obvious that the standard of unreasonable danger
is crucial to determining the efficacy of a design, it demonstrably merits
equal consideration in production defects as well.
The criteria against which the defective and unreasonably dangerous
nature of any product is tested are broad and far reaching. In a leading
article, Dean Wade10 has provided a list of seven succinct indicia for this
purpose:
1) The usefulness and desirability of the product
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relationship with the seller.
A parallel guarantee of quality is given the user or consumer by the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314:
Section 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind ....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ....
9. See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF Tomas § 402A (1966); Wade, supra note 7.
10. See Wade, supra note 7. It should be noted that Dean Wade's formulation is an
expansion and adaptation of negligence risk-utility concepts to strict products liability. See
RESTATEmENT (Second) OF TORTs § 283 (1966). This approach to strict liability has not gone
unchallenged. See Calabresi & Hirsehoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). It is clear to us that the major thrust of strict liability law has
adopted risk-utility concepts. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Metal Window Product Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 ('rex. Ct. App. 1972). Also note
that the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1970), specifically adopts the
standard of unreasonable danger as the standard for products covered under the Act.
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2) The availability of other and safer products to meet the same
need
3) The likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness
4) The obviousness of the danger
5) Common knowledge and normal public expectation of the dan-
ger (particularly for established products)
6) The avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (includ-
ing the effect of instructions or warnings)
7) The ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing
the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
While certain of these indicia may be quantifiable with the remainder
requiring subjective evaluation, the final decision as to whether a prod-
uct is in fact defective and unreasonably dangerous is an amalgam of all
seven. The determination of defect and its unreasonable danger is, in
one sense, subjective because each product must be viewed in the par-
ticular context of its function and use. The use of the same product in
two different environments, domestic and industrial, for example, may
lead to different conclusions regarding its defectiveness and unreason-
able danger. Thus it is critical that the product be described comprehen-
sively because only then can the appropriate focus be established for
application of the Wade indicia.
Yet the criteria are no less operative for the problem of production
defects, since the concept of defect is not self-defining when a product
contains a flaw. Since all products are flawed at some technological
level,11 the decision must still be made as to when a flaw emerges as a
11. To a metallurgist all metallic structures contain flaws or irregularities at some size
level. They range from dislocations at the atomic size level to cracks visible to the naked
eye. These flaws or deviations from structural perfection can have beneficial effects in cer-
tain use environments and deleterious effects in others, completely analogous to the de-
fectiveness or nondefectiveness, perhaps even utility, of the same product in different use
environments. Since these flaws can be identified in all products, the critical question to
be asked is when can these deviations from structural perfection really lead to a conclusion
of defect.
To give a sense of the scope of the problem involved in the attempt to classify structural
imperfections as flaws or ultimately as defects, consider examples of flaws (unfortunately
sometimes called defects by metallurgists) which always occur in metallic load-bearing
structures.
1. Dislocations. The yield stress of metals containing atoms arranged in ideal, struc-
turally perfect lattices has been calculated to be about a factor of one thousand higher than
that measured experimentally (see Frenkel, Zur Theorie der Elastizdtsgrenze und der
Festigheit Kristallinischer Kdper, 37 ZEITscHmFTr FOR PHYsIK, 572-609 (1926)). In 1934 this
discrepancy between theory and experiment was reconciled by the suggestion that all metals
contain line imperfections, or dislocations, which can move to cause yielding at stresses
much lower than that necessary to cause yielding in a structurally perfect, yet unobtain-
able, dislocation-free metal (see Orwan, Zur Kristallplastizitat. Ill. Uber den Mechanismus
des Gleituorganges, 89 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PHYSIK, 614-59 (1934); Polanyi, Uber eine Art
Gitterot6rung, die einen Kristall Plastish Machen K6nnte, 89 ZEiTscHIuFr FOmR PHYSIK
660-64 (1934); Taylor, The Mechanism of Plastic Deformation of Crystals. Part 1-Theo-
retically, 145 PROCEEDINCS OF THE ROYAL SocIETy OF LONDON 362-87 (1934)).
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defect. In order to make this decision, some judgmental standard must
be utilized. It is clear to us that this standard must be based on the con-
cept of unreasonable danger.1 2
However, it has long been recognized that metals harden due to continued cold working
(usually a beneficial effect). Yet this effect requires that the dislocations, or imperfections,
originally present in a metal must increase in number during continued permanent de-
formation of a metal. See Frank & Read, Multiplication Processes for Slow Moving Dis-
locations, 79 PHYSICAL REvIEw 722-23 (series 2, 1950). Unfortunately, an undesirable
consequence of hardening metals by cold working is the attendant decrease in ductility,
the ability to undergo general permanent deformation prior to fracture (e.g., Webster,
Christie & Pratt, Comparative Properties of Oxygen-Free High-Conductivity, Phosphorized
and Tough-Pitch Coppers, 104 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN INSITUTE OF MINING AND
METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, INSTITUTE OF METALS DIVISION 166-69 (1933)) and to signal that
the structure should be taken out of service. These imperfections then make the basic ma-
terial less strong than perfect material, but do permit the material to harden at the ex-
pense of ductility.
2. Foreign Elements and Inclusions. Minute or trace quantities of foreign elements can
lead to catastrophic fracture when the metallic structure is subjected to specific heat treat-
ments or use environments. E.g., Jolivet & Vidal, Valeur de L'essai de Resilience Pour L'etude
de la Fragilite de Revenu, 41 REVEU DE METALLURGIE 378-88 (1944). Many foreign elements
present in greater than trace concentrations are actually present in the form of inclusions
or second phase particles within the parent metallic structure. Inclusions which can be
classified as imperfections or flaws may be formed as a result of chemical processing reac-
tions in the melt (efidogenous inclusions) or may come from sources external to the melt
such as furnace linings (exogenous inclusions). Inclusions have a negligible effect on the
strength of metallic structures, but do decrease ductility, E.g., Chin, Hosford & Backofen,
Ductile Fracture of Aluminum, 230 TRANSACTIONS OF THE METALLURGICAL SOCIETY OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING, METALLURGICAL, AND PETROLEUM ENGINEERS 437-49 (1964).
Ductility can be increased by lowering inclusion contents but this involves the use of
costlier processing procedures. One can conclude, therefore, that inclusions and trace ele-
ments may lead to flaws or defects under certain conditions.
3. Solid Solutions and Precipitates. Additional elements are often added intentionally
to form alloys which are stronger than the parent metal. These alloying elements can
simply assume positions in the lattice sites of the parent metal to produce a substitutional
solid solution (brass is a common example of a substitutional solid solution produced by
the addition of zinc to copper). Substitutional solid solution strengthening also produces
an attendant decrease in ductility. E.g., Saeftel & Sachs, Festigkeitseigenschaften und
Struktur Einiger Begrenzter Mischkristallreiken, 17 ZErrscmuFT FUR METALLKUNDE 155-61
(1925). Elements whose atomic size is small compared to that of the parent metal may as-
sume positions within the interstices of the parent-metal lattice structure itself (carbon
and nitrogen can assume interstitial positions in iron). The inverse effects on yield strength
and ductility are also present in -interstitially hardened solid solutions. E.g., Smith &
Rutherford, Tensile Properties of Zone Refined Iron in the Temperature Range from 298*
to 4.2* K, 209 TRANSACTIONS OF THE METALLURGICAL SOCIETY OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
MINING, METALLURGICAL, AND PETROLEUM ENGINEERS 857-64 (1957). Alloying elements which
cannot go into solid solution in the parent metal often are intentionally added to form
precipitates, particles of a chemical composition and crystal structure different from that
of the parent.metal (aluminum alloys are commonly precipitation hardened). These pre-
cipitates produce a strengthening by obstructing dislocation motion (a possible benefit) but
again do lead to a decrease in ductility (possibly a deficiency). See Merica, Waltenburg &
Scott, Heat Treatment and Enstitution of Duralumin, 64 TRANSAcrIONS OF THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS 41-77 (1920).
4. Grain Boundaries. Metallic structures are not composed of single continuous three-
dimensional arrangements of atoms, but rather are composed of grains. The architectural
order of atoms within each grain is the same; the crystal axes of neighboring grains are
merely rotated with respect to one another. Grain boundaries are thin regions of archi-
tectural compromise between neighboring grains. Decreasing the grain size of a metal
through thermo-mechanical processing produces an increase in yield strength. See Sauveur,
Microstructure of Steel, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF T14E AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING ENGINEERS
546-57 (1893). Grain.refinement in steels has the added advantage that it increases the stress
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The above discussion has subscribed to the existing distinction be-
tween production and design defect cases. While at the polar extremes
sustainable before brittle fracture will occur by a process of cleavage along specific atomic
planes in the crystal lattice. See Petch, The Cleavage Strength of Polycrystals, 174 JOURNAL
OF THE IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE 25-28 (1953). Brittle fracture by cleavage is dependent upon
the specific chemistry and grain size of the steel but also is enhanced by low temperature
environments, high rates of loading, as well as sharp notches in the structure.
Grain refinement is not without its deleterious consequences in other use environments.
At high temperatures approaching the melting point of the metallic structure, grain
boundaries actually impart weakness in that they enhance high temperature permanent
deformation under constant load or creep. See Hanson, The Creep of Metals, 113 TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, IRON AND
STEEL DIVISION 15-57 (1939).
Materials processing and fabrication are thus based upon flaw or irregularity control to
achieve an economically feasible trade-off among all the properties of the material which,
together with proper design, serve to achieve a given performance requirement.
It should be abundantly clear that the mere presence of an identifiable irregularity or
flaw in a metallic structure is in and of itself an insufficient basis for the establishment of
defect.
5. Cracks. Failure by fracture in engineering structures commonly initiates at a crack
or discontinuity which existed prior to fracture. For example, cracks or discontinuities can
arise from solidification shrinkage. Inclusions, especially those which are strung out over
large distances during primary hot working to form "seams," are also a source of cracks.
Subsequent secondary forming operations can also lead to cracks or discontinuities, either
as a result of physically separating metal or folding metal over onto itself to form "laps."
Cracks or conditions which will promote cracks can also form during heat treatments in
the solid state, especially those which involve quenching from elevated temperatures. Ma-
chining or grinding marks can also be deleterious flaws under certain use conditions. Weld-
ing invariably introduces some level of holes or discontinuities and changes the properties
of the base metal in the vicinity of the weld as well. Corrosive or high temperature en-
vironments may also lead to the formation of cracks or holes in structures which would be
unaffected in less hostile use environments.
It has long been recognized that most fractures arising in structures or members which
flex develop by progressive crack propagation or fatigue. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE APPLICATION OF IRON TO RAILWAY STRUCTUREs (London,
1849). The earliest fatigue fracture remedies, still very widely used today, involved design-
ing structures to remove both sharp notches and abrupt changes of section or by designing
the part to reduce the applied stress level. See Wohler, Bericht fiber die versuche, welche
-.. mit Apparaten zum messen der Biegung und Verdrehung von Eisenbahnwagen-Achsen
wahrend der Fahrt, Angestellt Werden, 8 ZEiTscHRiFr FOR BAUEISEN 642-52 (1858). Case
hardening (e.g., GIAMBATrISTA DELLA PORTA, MAGIA NATURALIS (Naples, 1589) (english trans-
lation, London, 1658)) is another widely used technique for fatigue resistance which not
only physically hardens the surface but also introduces a favorable residual stress distribu-
tion. E.g., Buhler & Buckholtz, fiber die wirkung von eigenspannungen auf die schwingungs-
festigkeit, 3 MITTERLUNGER FORSCHUNGS INsTITUT 235-48 (1933) (it should again be noted
that residual stresses can be useful in certain applications and deleterious in others).
Hence, resistance to fracture is dependent not only on the nature of the bulk material
itself but the size of the cracks which it contains. It must be noted that without exception,
all metallic materials contain cracks even though they may be microscopic. This combined
role of crack size and material characteristics was first quantitatively investigated in ex-
periments on glass (see Griffith, The Phenomenon of Rupture and Flow in Solids, 221
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SocIErY OF LONDON 163-98 (series A, 1920))
and later extended to metals fractured under single or monotonic loading (see Irwin,
Fracture, in 79 HANDBUCH DER PHYSIK 551-90 (1958)) as well as cyclic loading (see Paris,
Gomez & Anderson, A Rational Analytic Theory of Fatigue, in THE TREND IN ENGINEERING
9-14 ((Univ. of Wash. ed. 1961)). However, these newer, more sophisticated quantitative
crack-propagation concepts cannot at present be applied to the design or failure analysis
of most metallic products. It should be obvious, therefore, that the fact that cracks exist
in all metallic materials does not mean that all materials are defective per se.
Hence, structural irregularities or flaws are inevitable in any metallic structure. Many
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of the frequency at which flaws occur this distinction has meaning, it
must be recognized that there exists a gray area in which the distinction
becomes blurred. For example, assume a truck leaf spring is flawed by
gouge marks on its surface. If a very small fraction of the leaf springs
produced by a given manufacturer contain these gouge marks, the judg-
ment will be made that the litigation will proceed in the context of a
production defect question."8 However, if a significant fraction of these
springs, as produced, contain the gouge marks, then the perspective of
the litigation may proceed on the premise of design defect. At which
point we shift from the former perspective to the latter will be of little
consequence, as long as the concept of unreasonable danger 14 is the
judgmental standard of every case in strict liability.
THE TRIAL PROCESS: AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW
A design-defect problem provides a convenient starting point for this
analysis. The decision that is made when a product design is declared
defective could be the equivalent of capital punishment of an entire
model line or at the very least of a certain aspect of that product. This
decision has major social and societal significance. It should be made
with full understanding of the complex trade-offs which are involved in
irregularities are actually introduced or controlled to enhance certain properties, with the
certain knowledge that others often will be compromised.
12. It should be dear from the textual discussion that this study finds the standard for
strict liability established by the California and New Jersey courts in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 20 Cal. App. 2d 33, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), and Glass v. Ford Motor
Co., No. L-17576-70 (N.J. Super. Ct., May 3, 1973), seriously off the mark. Those courts per-
mitted the establishment of defect without reference to the "unreasonable danger" stan-
dard. For a sharp criticism of Cronin, see Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect, 5 ST. MARYs L.J. 30 (1973). In a telling footnote, the Cronin court recognized that
defect could not be established without reference to some given standard while simulta-
neously discarding "unreasonable danger." It said:
We recognize, of course, the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness
standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, "there is now a cluster of useful prece-
dents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales
and warranty law.
20 Cal. App. 2d at 42, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
13. Whether or not the flaw is an unreasonably dangerous defect must be decided using
the standards of the risk-utility theory. See note 12 supra. It is our purpose here to focus
on the production-design defect dichotomy, not on the issue of unreasonable danger.
14. While the test of unreasonable danger is the same for both questions, the result
may be different for each case. For example, the burden of precaution in the production
defect case may be for the manufacturer to rid himself of the few gouge-marked springs,
while the burden of precaution for the design defect may be a substantial alteration in
either the design of the spring or the manufacturing process. A problem may arise if the
manufacturing standards of a given company give rise to a flaw which still meets the ac-
ceptable standards using risk-utility theory. In such an instance, in the absence of an ex-
press warranty, it would be improper to hold this manufacturer liable for a flaw based
upon a standard higher than that imposed on the industry as a whole.
433
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product design. 15 How in fact are the decisions made? Consider a case
which typifies the approach in vogue today. The case was particularly
well tried. Yet, the faults which are found in the trial reflect a litigation
emphasis and approach which we deem unsound when tested against the
express requirements of strict liability.
The product which was the subject of litigation was a printer-slotter
machine (see Figure A). The basic functions of the machine are to print
advertising and labelling material on corrugated cardboard and to cut
and score the cardboard for later assembly as cartons. Printing dies are
stapled on large rotating wooden rolls. The ink is transferred from the
upper portion of the machine to these rolls by a series of smaller rolls.
Because this machine is equipped to print in two colors, there are two
sets of ink-transfer and die-mounting rolls. The machine was designed
to open to a width of 30 inches in order to change the dies. When the
machine opens there is a clear passageway in the center of the machine
which permits a worker to enter and make die changes on the rolls.
The back (feed) end of the machine is equipped to feed the cardboard
into the first set of rolls for printing purposes. The cardboard then passes
through the second set of printing rollers located on the front or exit
end of the machine. When the cardboard emerges from the second set
of rollers, it passes into the slotter section of the machine which is inte-
grally attached to the front set of printing rolls. Adjustable knives are
located in this section to score and cut the cardboard.
The principal driving motor is located at the back end of the machine
and transfers power to both sets of printing rolls and the knives and
scores, using gears. When the machine is opened only the front end rolls
and knives and scores are mechanically disconnected from the driving
motor and are inoperative even though the primary motor may be ener-
gized. During this operation the back or feed end of the machine can
still function from the primary motor even when the machine sections
are separated. The passageway created by the opening of the machine is
thus bordered by the inoperative front rolls on one side and by the ro-
tating back rolls on the other, if the primary motor is on. An automatic
washing attachment was subsequently added to this machine. In order
for washing to take place, the rolls to be washed must be rotated by the
primary motor. If both rear feed and front exit ends are to be washed,
15. Wade, supra note 7.
434
Vol. 12: 425, 1974
Product Liability
ruq
435
Duquesne Law Review
the machine must be run in the closed position. The back (feed) end can
be washed alone when the machine is separated since the back feed-end
rolls can still be driven by the primary motor.
The injury to the plaintiff occurred when he entered into the open
passsageway of the printer-slotter. Since the machine separation only
prevented power transfer to the front end, there was still power available
to the rolls on the back (feed) end and they were in fact rotating, pre-
sumably washing the rear set of rolls, at the time of injury to the plain-
tiff.
Plaintiff walked through the open passageway of the machine to get
to an auxilliary piece of equipment, a staple gun, which was located at
the far end of the passageway. His motive for doing so was not altogether
clear but he apparently hoped to save time by getting to the staple gun
so that he could begin the next step in the operation and thus reduce the
amount of non-working time (or downtime) of the machine and thus
increase his earnings. Plaintiff was carrying a rag at the time and some-
how the rag was drawn into the moving back rollers. His hand followed
the rag and his arm followed his hand into the machine. The end result
was a plaintiff with an amputated arm.
The design defect claimed by plaintiff was that the machine was not
equipped with a breakaway switch shutting down the primary motor
and automatically cutting off power to both front and rear rolls when
the machine was opened up. With such a switch, the power to the back
rolls would have been shut off and those rolls not permitted to rotate
when the passageway was open. Plaintiff's expert testified to the feasibil-
ity of a breakaway switch-indeed a switch similar to a refrigerator door
switch which makes the light go on and off. Skillfully plaintiff's counsel
focused attention on three factors-the breakaway switch, the open
passageway and the amputated arm. The trilogy was hammered home
effectively and appeared to be the crux of the case as it was presented in
court.
On the basis of critical analysis, this approach is believed to be incon-
sistent with the meaning of strict liability. First, the product is brought
to the trial setting not in the atmosphere or context of its legitimate use
but in the atmosphere of the injury-creating event. This inside-out
approach seriously distorts the nature of the proceeding. What is on
trial first and foremost is a product design. The printer-slotter was de-
signed and operated with several complex trade-offs in mind. Among
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these trade-offs"0 must have been an assessment of the cost of having a
machine setup where the operator in the passageway could change front
roll dies while the back rolls were rotating in a wash cycle versus the
increased cost of having a setup where the back rolls could not operate
if the operator was changing front roll dies. If a simultaneous setting of
dies and washing of back rolls was inadvisable from a safety standpoint,
machine downtime would increase substantially. This consideration was
directly related to the actual operation of the machine, as this machine's
downtime affected the efficiency of the entire production process. Per-
haps the machine was unreasonably dangerous and perhaps the trade-offs
were sound, but the issue cannot be determined without a comprehen-
sive understanding of the product and its overall environment. It is
crucial to recognize that it is the product design that is on trial in an
action in strict liability. The injury-producing event reflects on the effi-
cacy of the design, but the question of unreasonably dangerous defect is
not solely defined by the injury. Lest it may seem that there is a defense
bias to the insistence upon a comprehensive description of the product,
it is suggested that in fact the failure to place the product in its overall
perspective can compromise plaintiff's as well as defendant's case. Com-
prehensive product description is, in our opinion, the cornerstone of the
product liability trial.
Secondly, the role of the expert came to the fore in this case in a man-
ner which brings to light some of the problems which are indigenous to
the use of an expert in a complex products trial. The plaintiff's expert
16. The competing factors which may come into play in the design of the printer-
slotter are:
(1) The necessity for the machine to open for the purpose of changing dies on one or
both sets of rollers (front and feed ends).
(2) The necessity of having the feed end of the machine operative when machine sec-
tions are separated.
(3) The effect of subsequent design modification as a result of the installation of auto-
matic washers for the cleaning of rolls.
(4) The functional advantage of simultaneously setting scores and knives on the in-
active front end while permitting operation of the automatic washers and rollers
on the feed end.
(5) An understanding of the time sequence in setting up, cleaning, and operating the
machine within the pay incentive scheme of the plant.
(6) The operational feasibility, cost, and effectiveness of various kinds of breakaway
switches.
(7) The necessity of cleaning both sets of rolls subsequent to single color printing.
(8) A precise description of the location and direction of rotation of all rotating rolls.
(9) The location of all controls and auxiliary power sources with a clear understanding
of their functional purposes.
(10) The perception of the open machine as an access route to auxiliary equipment.
(11) The necessity of two auxiliary power sources, one for die changing and color regis-
tration and the other for opening the machine.
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was subjected to the normal qualification procedure. Plaintiff presented
the general engineering qualifications of his expert, alluding to skill in
the general principles of design; defendant countered with arguments
that the expert's lack of specific experience in the design of printer-
slotter machines disqualified him. These disparate approaches to the
qualification of the expert, not uncommon in products liability litiga-
tion, obfuscated the real issue of what qualifications are appropriate to
speak to the design of a product. The trial judge predictably ruled in
favor of permitting the expert to testify.
The common belief that cross-examination of an inappropriate ex-
pert will cure all ills is not well founded. It may be very hard indeed to
dislodge the testimony of an inappropriate expert and it may be difficult
to retain the credibility of an appropriate expert who may be discredited
under cross-examination because of his lack of specific design experience
related to the product under adjudication.
A significant problem which surfaced throughout the analysis of ex-
pert testimony was the failure of the expert to describe the reasoning
process which led to his conclusion. If the only input the jury has pro-
vided for its consideration is two conflicting expert opinions without the
supporting reasoning processes which links the foundation testimony to
those opinions, the jury is in no position to intelligently choose between
them. Further, there exists a lack of clarity as to the role of the expert
in the trial setting. Too often the expert comes to the trial for the sole
purpose of filling an evidentiary gap in the prima facie case or the de-
fense case. Rather, it is contended that the expert's opinion should be
based upon the results of a broad inquiry into the totality of the product
in the environment of its use and that this comprehensive inquiry, to-
gether with his underlying reasoning process, should be developed dur-
ing his testimony. All of these points shall be examined in greater depth
in a later section.
While many of the problems found in a design defect case are also
present in a case characterized as a production defect case, there are
other problems which are peculiar to the production defect situation.
To illustrate these additional problem areas, consider an accident al-
legedly resulting from a broken truck spring.
The accident occurred following impact with a car when the truck
veered off to the right and overturned after striking an embankment.
The plaintiff-driver testified that the right front end of the truck cab
dropped down and that he lost control of the truck prior to striking the
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car. Subsequent to the accident it was discovered that the right front leaf
spring had fractured just behind the front eye (see Figure B). Plaintiff
contended that the fracture was initiated by flaws in the manufacturing
process. The two manufacturing flaws identified by plaintiff were: (1)
gouge marks on the main leaf in the vicinity of the front eye, and (2)
undesirable microstructure near the surface of the main leaf in the vi-
cinity of the front eye which caused a structural weakness in the metal.
Plaintiff alleged that these flaws rose to the level of defect and led to the
FIGURE B
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premature fatigue failure of the leaf spring, causing the truck to go out
of control. Defendant denied that the metal had substandard properties
and that the gouge marks had any influence on the fracture. He but-
tressed this conclusion by pointing out that the fracture originated be-
neath the surface, ruling out any causative relationship between either
of the alleged defects and the resulting fracture.
A crucial problem here was the establishment of a conclusion of legal
defect arising from production flaws. Strangely enough, the primary
focus of both plaintiff and defendant was on the origin of the flawed
condition rather than on the effect of these flaws upon the service per-
formance of the spring. It should, however, be obvious that in order to
establish the presence of an unreasonably dangerous defect the flaws
must be tested against standards of performance of the device and not
the manufacturing standards. 17 Processing and physical property stan-
dards may be used, however, as guides to determining deviations from
normal average quality (i.e., flaws). These flaws must then be tested
against the expected performance behavior. Thus, in this case the gouge
marks on the spring, although admittedly a flaw, might not be a defect
in the legal sense. A similar conclusion might also be reached with re-
gard to the adequacy of the microstructure at the surface of the spring.
The difficulties in establishing whether the flaws were the principal
cause of the spring failure, and if so, whether they made the product
defective and unreasonably dangerous, were compounded by the fact
that the physical evidence was poorly preserved and wantonly dismem-
bered and partially destroyed during its examination in a misguided
attempt to provide indicator evidence. Here, even if there had been
adequate testing and evaluation of well-preserved evidence, there still
would have been, in our opinion, substantial difficulties in definitively
establishing whether the spring failed by progressive fatigue or single-
load impact. Thus, in order to establish defect, it was imperative that
any other indicator evidence relevant to the mode of failure be utilized
by the expert in reaching his conclusion. One must be prepared to ques.
tion the viability of the trial process when the issues are close and there
is insufficient attention paid to the preservation and meaningful testing
of the physical evidence. At some stage the court must be adequately
17. The term "standards of performance" denotes the behavior of the product within
the range of normal consumer uses. The range is essentially defined by actual consumer
practice and not manufacturer foreseeability. Essentially, we are describing herein a risk-
utility standard based upon a community standard.
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equipped to judge the adequacy of the technical evidence necessary to
make out a prima facie case.
Against this background of uncertainty, there can be no justification
for the predilection of experts to state conclusions of defect or causation
in absolutist terms. We suggest that to confront a jury with two opposing
experts, each speaking in the jargon of his profession and concluding
with a dogmatic assertion which admits of no contrary possibilities, is
to place a responsibility for choice upon the jury which it has not been
equipped to handle. What the jury may be equipped to do, however, is
to evaluate the experts' decision-making process and their inherent cred-
ibility.
To recapitulate, our research has identified the following problem
areas:
a) Inadequate and disjointed product description;
b) Early, excessive, and dominant position of the product as an injury-
producing rather than a productive or useful device, which can
obscure or supplant certain basic elements of the cause of action;
c) Inadequate or obscured identification and proof of defect;
d) Obfuscation of the causation question by permitting its improper
merger with defect and injury issues;
e) Poor procedures for evidence gathering, control, and preservation,
and
f) Role of the expert witness:
i) utilization of the expert to plug an evidentiary gap;
ii) insufficient attention to qualification of an expert as the ap-
propriate expert in a given case;
iii) presentation by the expert of his technical conclusions without
addressing and evaluating the totality of the engineering in-
dicia he utilized in arriving at his conclusions; and
iv) presentation and unrealistic evaluation by the expert of his
conclusions without regard to the totality of the event.
Having identified in general some major problem areas, there follows
an extended discussion of some proposed solutions. For a comprehensive
understanding of our problem identification and characterization, the
reader is referred to the Appendix. The thesis upon which all of these
proposals are premised is that a products liability trial is first and fore-
most a trial of a product. Given this basic premise, it becomes possible
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to define the trial scenario, the role of the expert, the functions of the
judge and jury, and to restructure the role of each to meet a common
objective. We believe that a restructuring is entirely feasible within the
parameters of the existing adversarial system. More to the point, we
believe it to be of critical importance.
THE TRIAL OF THE PRODUCT
Throughout this study, products cases have been characterized and
analyzed according to the following elements: a description of product,
accident, and defect; a description of the unreasonably dangerous nature
of the product; the causal relationship between the defect and the re-
sulting harm; and the issue of proximate cause.
The evidentiary flow relating to each of these elements in the two
cases previously described is shown schematically on Figures C and D.
Note in particular that the product description testimony is interspersed
throughout the trial and that a substantial as well as factually important
fraction of this testimony appears in the. defendant's case. While a proper
foundation for all the elements of a products case may be contained
somewhere in the record and thus may- well be available for purposes
of appeal, the improper sequencing and intermingling of evidence re-
lated to different elements of the cause of action not only militate against
effective evidentiary transmission, but corrupt the basic integrity of
strict products liability.
Since the manufacturer's conduct is no longer on trial in strict lia-
bility, it follows that the central issue in a products trial must be the
product in the environment of its use. It is the product itself that must
ultimately be judged as defective and unreasonably dangerous. It there-
fore follows that the product must be viewed in the totality of its
environment before the issue of defect can be properly joined. A com-
prehensive description of the product in the environment of its use
should precede any of the other elements in a products trial. If this
product is not appreciated in the environment of its use, the consider-
ation of the defect and causation issues can never be properly addressed.
The necessity for adequate product description appears to be in the
nature of a motherhood statement, but product description has been
found to be deficient in a substantial number of cases. Difficulties en-
countered later in the trial are often directly attributable to the weak
foundation of an inadequate product description, which has been found
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to compromise both plaintiffs' and defendants' cases. The failure to first
describe the product in the environment of its use can result in several
serious distortions in the comprehension of the product. First, the prod-
uct is viewed primarily as an injury-producing instrument rather than
as a useful, functioning device. Second, the random interspersion of
product description among the various elements of the cause of action
not only militates against understanding the product but also taints the
ultimate comprehension of the product with value judgments derived
from other elements of the lawsuit. Third, if the accident and injury
are graphically described on the witness stand at the beginning of the
trial and reinforced by the continued presence of the maimed plaintiff
himself, it is difficult, if not impossible, to overcome in a jury's mind the
inference that the product whose use led to this injury must indeed be
unreasonably dangerous.
Demonstrative evidence should be provided at the inception of the
trial to familiarize the court with the product in question. This product
description can be accomplished in several ways. The product itself
might well be described by an expert who will later testify as to defect
and causation. A user of the product can also provide part or all of this
description since his experiences would focus attention on the product
in its use environment. This testimony can be offered in conjunction
with such visual aids as movies or video tapes of the product in use when
it is necessary for adequate comprehension. Mock-ups of salient features
of the product can also be used to clarify the function and operation of
the product.
In addition to exploring the operation of the product in the environ-
ment of its use, the economics of the product must also be addressed as
a critical part of the product description. This economic probing should
include not only the manufacturer's costs in producing this product or
viable alternatives, but also the economic perceptions of the user of the
product. For example, in the printer-slotter case described earlier, the
plaintiff believed he was minimizing downtime by leaving the feed-end
rollers running while walking through the open passageway. The reduc-
tion of downtime would augment his income since he was paid a higher
hourly rate when the machine was in production. Indeed a large number
of other trade-offs should have been considered to enhance the under-
standing of the product in its environment.18 Only after an adequate
18. See note 16 supra.
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perception of the product in question has been accomplished can the
central issues of defect and causation be addressed.
To implement this product-based reorientation, we propose a seriated
trial' in which the product is first tried before the jury on the question
of whether or not the product itself, apart from any considerations aris-
ing from the injury-producing event, is defective and unreasonably
dangerous. The product itself would first be extensively described in
the manner outlined previously. The alleged defect would then be
identified. The design would next be tested against the Wade indicia,'
20
allowing viable alternatives to be examined in order to weigh the ques-
tion of defect. These potential viable alternatives would be described
in the same manner used to describe the product itself. At the comple-
tion of this evidentiary presentation, with direct and cross-examination
by both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel, the jury would be asked to
make its initial determination as to whether or not the product is defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous. This format is particularly amenable
to design defect cases. The absence of the plaintiff and injury-related
evidence during this portion of the trial would reduce the possibility
of elements extraneous to the design problem interfering with the
proper weighing of the defect issue as intended under strict liability.
We recognize that there may be potential difficulties in implementing
a truly seriated trial and securing a jury decision on the defect issue
alone. However, as a first step in the implementation of this suggested
trial format, a resequencing of the evidentiary presentation to follow
the seriated structure is proposed.
A seriated trial appears also to be feasible in many production defect
cases, especially those in which the alleged defect can be clearly identi-
fied without recourse to inference. The product in these cases would
again be thoroughly described, but it then would be tested for defect
against performance standards developed during trial, utilizing a risk-
utility theory.21 In many cases this would require a description of per-
formance standards not only at the time the product left the hands of
19. The concept of the bifurcated trial has been presented by several judicial authors;
see Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L REv. 389
(1938); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831 (1961). A case comment on
the additional time length required thereby and the validity of bifurcated trials per se
may be found at 74 HARV. L. RaV. 781 (1961).
20. Wade, supra note 7.
21. Id.
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the manufacturer, but also after a reasonable period of ordinary use as
well as foreseeable misuse.
The jury must be educated to the fact that all products contain
certain levels of flaws. Only when a particular flaw is outside the limits
of acceptable performance standards can a production defect be estab-
lished. If the flaw lies within the norms of the manufacturer's quality
spectrum but outside acceptable performance standards, the case can
only go forward on a theory of generic defect or design on the basis of
improper quality standards. The climate of a products trial as currently
litigated often prevents the defendant from providing a clear base line
of normal average quality. To do this requires the admission of his
tolerating certain levels of flaws, a position which invites the attack of
plaintiff's counsel. Yet it is precisely this determination of normal
average quality and permissible levels for flaws based on performance
standards that is central to the determination of defect and unreasonable
danger in a production defect case.
It should be noted that in litigation a threshold issue of a special
aspect of causation often surfaces even before the issue of defect can be
resolved. We term this special aspect of causation technical causation.
Technical causation is intimately tied to the establishment of a produc-
tion defect. Given the existence of a deviation from the manufacturer's
standards, i.e., a flaw, the technical causation question is simply, "Did
this flaw cause this failure or malfunction of the product?"
For example, in the litigation centering around the broken truck
spring (described in brief earlier and detailed in the Appendix under
heading Case E), the technical causation issue is whether the flaws (gouge
marks on the spring surface and allegedly imperfect microstructure)
caused the spring to fail. Questions such as these are essentially technical
in nature and obviously must be addressed before the flaw is examined
to establish whether or not it was an unreasonably dangerous defect.
If it is shown that the flaw could not cause the failure or malfunction,
then the only other product liability alternative would be product
design. Too often the technical causation question is bypassed at the
initial stages of litigation. It surfaces, if at all, in the overall causation
question where the inquiry is whether the defect caused the injury-
producing event. The effect of this unfortunate confusion of issues is
that a truly technological issue which may be amenable to precise
technological resolution is lost in the morass of legal causation evidence
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which focuses upon the whole panoply of events linking product failure
to injury.
If, however, insufficient attention is focused on the relationship of
the flaw to the failure or malfunction of the product, then the pervasive
effect is simply the creation of an aura of defect without the hard proof
necessary to relate the failure to the flaw. This proof can take the form
of physical examination, or engineering calculations, or whatever is
needed to establish the technical causation link. Sometimes this detailed
examination is compromised by the deterioration of evidence or the
disciplinary bias of the expert. However, these difficulties are not a
rational basis for deflecting attention away from the crucial technical
causation issue. An earlier litigation of this issue is essential to avoid the
cascading confusion which results from the introduction of evidence
relating to subsequent events in the causal chain. In Figure E the posi-
tion of the technical causation issue in the seriated trial of a production
defect case is shown.
The subtleties of the technical issues may force an expansion of the
seriated trial of a production defect case to include more than the defect
issue. An example of this would be the determination of whether the
actual failure occurred as the result of a single load or progressively by
fatigue, which would necessitate drawing upon some of the evidentiary
elements of causation-in-fact, as well as technical causation. The expert's
analysis of a failure which potentially involves fatigue always proceeds
by establishing the mode of failure first and then the defect, if any,
which promoted this mode of failure. Since in these cases the issues of
defect, technical causation, and causation in fact are inextricably inter-
twined technically, it appears appropriate to combine them in the
seriated trial format as well.
Using a seriated format, the trial of the product can be conducted so
that a jury will be given a coherent evidentiary basis for the establish-
ment of defect and unreasonable danger. While current litigation prac-
tice may lead to a trial record sufficient for the purposes of appeal, the
usual evidentiary sequencing does not provide the clarity and direction
required for the real task of trying the product itself. The seriated trial
format, which isolates and examines the product in the environment of
its use, is offered as a viable means for achieving the goals of strict
liability, untainted by the irrelevancies of the manufacturer's conduct
or unduly influenced by the injury-producing event.
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IDENTITY AND ROLE OF THE EXPERT
To achieve validity in strict liability, the expert's opinion must be
a subjective amalgam of physical indicator evidence and must be firmly
based upon an understanding of the product. The opinion must reflect
the product in the context of its actual use, its relationship to other
products meeting the same need, the obviousness of and the ability to
eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the product's useful-
ness or significantly increasing its cost.
If the downtime of the printer-slotter would have been substantially
increased by the use of the breakaway switch, the economic utility of
this machine might have been seriously impaired. If such a switch could
have been easily made inoperative by the machine operator, one could
argue that the machine might be safer without the switch. Considera-
tions such as these must be addressed by the expert and brought forth
by him in trial, if proper scope is to be given to the question of un-
reasonably dangerous defect. It is the jury's function to decide the
existence of defect. But how can their answer be properly framed, if
the expert's view of the product is myopic and fails to consider the
product as it is actually used within its environment before he concludes
defect?
Thus it is neither reasonable nor, in fact, proper to expect an expert
to function within the limited domain of viewing the product only from
the standpoint of whether a proposed modification would have pre-
vented the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff's expert in discussing the
adequacy of the design of the printer-slotter justified his opinion of
defective design by proclaiming the caveat "all machines must be as
humanly safe as possible." If this is the only principle upon which we
base the concept of unreasonable danger, then are we not insisting on
a posture of absolute liability? The test of strict liability is not an
absolute one, but is a balance of meaningful trade-offs between risk and
utility. It is not meant to be simply an assessment of what alteration a
product should have had to have prevented this particular injury.
There are other aspects of the expert's role that must be considered.
The initial decision as to whether or not a lawsuit is even warranted
can be made intelligently by counsel only after the evidence has been
identified and examined by the expert. There are few instances in
which the surface appearance of the tangible evidence speaks un-
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ambiguously to the attorney. And it is only the expert-who can properly
suggest that more detailed examination and testing are indicated.
While counsel must guide the expert concerning the feasible eco-
nomic limits of his investigation, the expert must also guide counsel,
especially in the initial stages of investigation, as to the reasonable
certainty of what may or may not be anticipated. This requires that the
expert be considered as a resource and not a tool to be later used to fill
an evidentiary gap during trial. A more appropriate view of the expert
in products liability litigation is as a co-equal partner22 with counsel
from the moment they agree to undertake the lawsuit. Once this partner-
ship is entered, the expert's role should expand to encompass the direc-
tion which discovery procedures will take. He must synthesize the
totality of the evidence, non-technical as well as technical, and he must
exercise proper control and care of the physical evidence.
If, for example, the issues of defect and causation hinge on whether a
particular part of a product failed by fatigue or by the application of a
single load, the physical evidence is crucial. But if the broken parts have
reposed in a junk yard for three years, exposed to the elements, and the
fracture surfaces have not only corroded but have been knocked about,
any probative value the evidence may have had has most certainly been
lost. Such evidence leads only to the sort of speculation that serves no
useful purpose for either side in confronting the real issues. It is only the
careful expert who can guide counsel and provide the proper considera-
tions for control and preservation of the physical evidence.
In very few instances, however, is the expert's judgment based solely
on technical evidence. His conclusions, more often than not, are a
composite judgment based upon the physical evidence, the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, his understanding of the product and
its use, and finally upon his technologically-founded intuitive sense. In
synthesizing a conclusion, the expert must not only reach the conclusion
which is most probable but he must also balance that conclusion against
other possibilities23 which he considers to be less probable.24 This is the
art form of the technologist.
22. In products liability litigation, an optimal utilization of the talents of the expert
is of critical importance due to the extremely complex nature of the issues to which his
expertise is directed. The concept that the attorney and expert must share responsibility
for the course of the litigation, with the expert's having full authority for development of
the technical aspects of the case, is advocated for general trial practice by Nickerson, The
Expert Technical Witness on Trial, 50 A.B.A.J. 731 (1964).
23. In a litigation centering around the design of a 30 year-old steel pickling machine,
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Popular misconception notwithstanding, the technological expert
does not bring an absolute sense of precision to most, if not all, of his
opinions. It must be recognized that any product is a compromise
between quantifiable aspects of its design and specifications and the
uncertainties of actual performance of the product in the environment
of use. This gap is usually closed by the safety factor but it focuses
precisely on the inherent uncertainties in any design (see Figure F).
Thus, when a product is challenged as defective and unreasonably
dangerous, the issue lies in this band of uncertainty between the quanti-
fiable engineering parameters and the performance of the product in
one of the issues was whether or not it was possible for a link on a partially corroded chain
to have engaged a lug projecting from a rack. The rack had overturned during the oper-
ation of the machine and had killed an employee. At the time of the accident, the machine
had 16 chains. The four chains in the vicinity of the rack which overturned had not been
identified, but all 16 were removed and stored in a garage for some years. The rack was
never removed from service or identified. One of plaintiff's experts, a safety expert, did not
bother to examine the chains, but merely concluded, retrospectively, that the design was
faulty because a man had been killed. Plaintiff's second expert examined only one of the
16 chains-not necessarily one of the ones on the rack-and concluded that one link of
this chain had corroded to the point where it could have engaged a lug on a rack. Had the
experts, at the very least, examined all of the chains to determine how many oversize links
there were, they might have been able to give some reasonable probabilities to reinforce
the plaintiff's contention that an oversize link had caused the rack to tip. As it was, the
limited evidence offered for the theory of faulty design--one link on one chain-could not
be advanced as the most probable cause of the accident when balanced against the other
possible explanations suggested by the defense. To compound the difficulty, these other
possible causes were not considered by the plaintiff's experts in reaching their conclusions.
Needless to say, the plaintiff lost. It is our contention that the expert must see himself
and must be viewed by both counsel and court as taking a global view of the problems
of identification of an unreasonably dangerous defect and the establishment of causation.
These problems arise, in our opinion, not necessarily because of the incompetence of the
expert, but rather from the traditionally limited role which has been assigned to him.
24. Suggestions that the jury itself goes through a process of balancing probabilities and
possibilities in order to arrive at its verdict on the facts, and an accompanying analysis of
that process in terms of elementary statistical methods, can be found in Cullison, Proba-
bility Analysis, 1969 TOL. L. REV. 538. Many articles are devoted to expositions of the
use of statistical techniques to augment and implement the fact-finding process. See Ball,
The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 807
(1961); Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
23 [hereinafter cited as Broun & Kelly]; Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-finding
Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]; Tribe, Trial by Mathe-
matics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]; Comment, Evidence-
Rules of Admissibility and the Law of Probability, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 285 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Admissibility]. One use of the above probability theory hitherto has
been to attempt to show that what actually occurred on a particular unknown and unique
instance of interest to the jury was more likely than not to have been a certain event "A"
rather than the less likely event "B." This technique was utilized to identify a defendant
by circumstantial evidence in People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1968). The additional uncertainty introduced should a jury be asked to "pyramid the
probabilities" to reach its decision by assuming the certainty of each event in a chain of
disputed events is dangerous at best. The problems inherent when probabilities are made
interdependent and interrelated, when the viability of a conclusion depends on the cor-
rectness of all prior statistical assumptions, have caused authors to relegate probability
theory as a trial tool to being an "interesting method of looking at the fact-finding process"
(see Tribe, supra note 24, at 1337) but one "... more dangerous than fruitful." See
Kaplan, supra note 24, at 1073.
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the environment of its use. This band of uncertainty is inherent in the
establishment of a production defect just as it is in the establishment of
a design defect and arises in the litigation of both the defect and causa-
tion issues. It is a travesty to expect an expert to bring any more cer-
tainty to his conclusions of defect and causation than existed in the
original engineering of the product.
To shatter the myth of absolute scientific certainty in the expert's
having reached his conclusions, it is essential that the expert be ques-
tioned by counsel in a manner which will permit his synthesizing process
to be completely revealed to the jury.25 The function of the expert is to
utilize his evaluative sense in assessing difficult fact situations. Thus the
traditional practice of basing an opinion upon an entire set of facts
taken at 100 per cent probability of truth raises a serious question as to
the validity of the expert's opinion. To counter, the opposing side
removes one or more of the facts and assigns a 0 per cent probability of
truth to those previously assumed facts. This approach, rather than
demonstrating the real-world probabilities which result in sensitively
balanced intermediate positions inherent in a valid decision-making
process, distorts the process by giving an aura of unreality to any opin-
ion. Note that cross-examination under this unrealistic approach
25. Opponents of the proposal to utilize expert testimony at less than the 100 per cent
certainty levels will certainly advance the proposition that the expert's credibility before
the jury is much reduced by his admitting only a 60 per cent or 80 per cent probability
level for a given opinion. See Broun & Kelly, supra note 24. Difficulties also arise when the
"80% certain" expert is subject to cross-examination by an opponent whose own expert
professes to have decided the disputed facts at 100 per cent levels. Neither of these criticisms
is viable when a careful analysis is made of the overall function of the expert and his re-
lation to the finder of fact. Intrinsic to every decision process, including the jury's, is the
assessment of the probabilities of the various subdecisions. It is this very cumulation pat-
tern of the assessment process, coupled with probability evaluations, which we propose to
have the expert present to the jury. In the present trial system, the "practice of repeating
the assumed facts over and over until the aura of assumption is gone" further leads the
jury to "accept as truth assumptions which properly should have probabilities associated
with them." Admissibility, supra note 24, at 1291. But there is a danger that the court
itself will refuse to find a probabilistic analysis of less than 100 per cent certainty to be of
sufficient probative value to warrant its being submitted to the jury. This facet of the prob-
lem is particularly well-demonstrated by the cases in which a medical doctor's opinion was
formulated of necessity in terms of medical probability, yet was inadmissible because the
probability did not approach "reasonable medical certainty." See cases noted in Broun &
Kelly, supra note 24, at 59. Conceivably the same argument might bar admission of the
technical expert's probability assessments on the grounds that anything less than "scientific
certainty" has no probative value. The problem remains that there have been no judicial
determinations to quantify either "medical" or "scientific" certainties. For an interesting
solution to this question, see Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965),
wherein the expert's testimony in terms of "90%-probable," was held not to be "reasonable
medical certainty" when originally presented at trial. Upon remand and new trial, the
answer to the hypothetical was admitted when the expert omitted the percentage from his
answer.
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may result in the opposite conclusion based on equally unrealistic
probabilities.
The problem described above is serious enough when one is faced
with expert testimony from a single technical discipline. When the
litigation necessarily involves the interrelationship between two or
more technical disciplines, the failure to reveal the probabilistic aspect
of the decision-making process compounds the felony, for now each
discipline builds upon the conclusions of the other, using unrealistic
probability levels in support of the other discipline's conclusions. 2
Unless the synthesizing process is completely and coherently revealed
in the courtroom the jury may indulge in a process of evaluating the
expert testimony, probably by half-believing some of the opinion and
discarding the rest.27 The juries are then left to their own devices in
conjuring up a scientific theory of the case which lies somewhere in
between the theory of the plaintiff's expert and the theory of the defen-
dant's expert. The assumption of this process is that the truth rests
somewhere between 0 per cent and 100 per cent credibility and the jury
exercises the normal evaluative role that it accomplishes when it evalu-
ates key testimony. This assumption must be resisted as inaccurate in
cases involving expert testimony. The function of the expert is to
evaluate the close case and bring his evaluative sense to difficult fact
26. The myraid problems arising from expert testimony which is based on the opinion
of other experts has been explored in great depth in the literature. See Maguire & Hahesy,
Requisite Proof of Basis for Exprt Opinion, 5 VAND. L. REv. 432 (1952); Rheingold, The
Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1962). The problem discussed herein
presupposes that the second expert opinion will be admissible.
27. Much criticism exists of the current practice of using the medical expert to
set forth an opinion without permitting him to substantiate it by also setting forth
all information the expert himself feels had had a bearing on his ultimate conclusions.
The within plea to allow the technical consultant in products cases to place before the
jury not only the opinion but also the evaluative balancings of evidentiary facts against
technical expertise through which that opinion had been formulated joins the plea of the
medical expert in this regard:
In all instances, the expert should be allowed to tell the court exactly how he reached
his opinion and what were the sources of information . . . to describe in fairly precise
terms his own process of evaluating his source material . . . . What information did
he reject and which accepted . . . what did he place great weight on, and what did he
minimize? . . . and why he evaluated the clinical material in these ways.
Louisell & Diamond, The Psychiatrist as Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Specula-
tions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1330, 1354 (1964).
The controversy over admitting the bases for medico-psychiatric opinions, however, may
be more founded on the fact that some of the medical diagnoses rest upon evidence itself
inadmissible as hearsay, rather than a failure by the. attorney to recognize its value as
measured by increased jury understanding as seems to be the case in products litigation
to date. Regardless of the reasons currently in vogue for failing to allow the expert witness
to propound the bases and reasoning processes whereby he reached his opinion, it is sug-
gested that serious consideration be given to a full revelation of the expert's reasoning
process to the jury.
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situations. The jury should then choose between the competing expert
evaluations rather than formulate its own notion of the case as an
amalgam of the testimony of plaintiff's and defendant's expert. If the
jury is to function with competing experts it cannot create its own
theory of the case. Rather it should evaluate the competing expert
evaluations and make an intelligent choice between them. This makes
it all the more crucial that experts address themselves to real probabili-
ties and to a sensitive evaluation of competing possibilities rather than
to the formulation of unrealistic positions. It should be carefully noted
that what is here suggested is a refinement and an enhancement of the
adversary system rather than a weakening of its traditional role.
There is no question that juries are well-equipped, as the triers of
fact, to evaluate human behavior in judging the validity of testimony.
When the questions center around the technological behavior of a
product, however, they must rely on the experts' interpretation of all
of the indicator evidence. This interpretation must be comprehensive
enough to reveal how the expert reaches his conclusions as well as his
perception of the probable certainties and uncertainties. If not, it be-
comes inevitable that the jury's evaluation will remain at a superficial
level and will not be capable of probing the substantive questions that
must be addressed in finding an unreasonably dangerous defect or
establishing causation.
Yet it must be noted that regardless of how well an expert addresses
himself to real probabilities and to sensitive evaluation of competing
possibilities, there remains a major question whether any layman can
bring to bear the necessary evaluative sense to the litigation process
where complex technological data is involved. This question must
ultimately be considered and answered.
The role of the expert has been described as that of a resource, not
a tool, as a co-equal partner with counsel, not as a filler of an evidentiary
gap. But who is this person or persons? He must have a sufficient under-
standing of the law to permit his judgment of technical issues to reflect
the proper perspective for advancing an opinion of unreasonably
dangerous defect. 28 He must be sufficiently expert to perceive the scope
of the inquiry necessary during discovery as well as in further testing
and evaluating of the evidence. The expert should not only provide
guidance for counsel, but where necessary he must undertake self-
28. See Wade, supra note 7.
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education prior to trial in those aspects of the particular technology
with which he is unfamiliar.
In pre-trial hearings, the experts should play an active role in aiding
court and counsel in defining the appropriate technical issues. During
the trial, apart from his direct testimony, he should "second-chair"
counsel and thereby provide relevant insight on the development of
testimony concerning product description and defect and guide the
direction and content of the cross-examination of the opposing expert.
This then is the expert, as defined by his role. Regarding the qualifica-
tions the expert must possess in order to be identified as such, this
research group is now at work with a committee of the National Society
of Professional Engineers to establish more definitive guidelines to aid
the technologist as well as the court and counsel in recognizing and
qualifying the expert. This problem is a crucial one in the products
liability area since the range of expertise is so very broad. It runs the
gamut from the garage mechanic to the highly learned academician.
While this entire spectrum of experts can contribute effectively to the
litigation process, the broad band of potential expertise is so unlike the
very narrow range of expert qualifications to which we are accustomed
in the medical area that we must be concerned with the appropriateness
of the expert to speak the issues.29 It is clear that guidelines for technical
experts must be drawn so as to distihguish their particular skills from
those of other types of experts as well as to indicate how these skills are
to be characterized. Thus the focus is not only on credentials and ex-
perience qualifications, but also on developing a method for determin-
ing the appropriate expertise to speak to a particular issue.
In addition we have recognized a serious absence of standards for the
gathering, preservation, control, physical examination, and testing of
physical evidence as well as standardized formats for experts' reporting
of the indicator evidence. It is no exaggeration to say that the deficien-
cies in these areas have been scandalous. A committee on the technical
aspects of product liability has been established under the auspices of
the American Society for Testing and Materials for the purpose of
developing the consensus standards necessary to alleviate these ills. It is
strongly contended, however, that the procedures for legal qualification
of experts and the evaluation of technical evidence should occur prior
to trial, during the pre-trial hearing, so as to establish the appropriate-
29. Korn, supra note 3, at 1094-97.
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ness of the experts and the appropriateness of their testimony in focusing
on the issues to be litigated.
It is not a valid premise to assume that the ills engendered by an
improper expert witness in the courtroom are eliminated or obviated
by skillful cross-examination. The real danger of cross-examination of
the improper witness lies in diverting the attention of the jury from the
real issues of the case into a morass of technical minutiae that may cause
their evaluative sense to focus more naturally on the plaintiff's injury
or other areas not directly relevant to the presence or absence of defect
in the product.
The cross-examination, however, of the appropriate expert, who has
been permitted to describe his observations of the physical evidence and
tests, who has related the facts surrounding the incident, and who has
bared the process of synthesis which led to his conclusions, will at once
be more critical and more effective in revealing the expert's capacity
and ability for evaluation. It is precisely this reasoning process that must
be exposed to the finder of fact if strict liability litigation is to respond
to the proper posture of technology.
JUDGE AND JURY IN A PRODUCTS CASE
The central concerns for the proper adjudication of a question in
strict liability have been shown to be the comprehensive examination of
the behavior of the product within its environment and the role of the
expert, which is not only expanded in scope but is made more consistent
with the technological decision-making process. The problem of defin-
ing a mechanism to implement this shift in orientation must now be
confronted. Whatever the degree of acceptance such a suggestion of
re-focusing may gain in theory, however, there follows the determinative
question of defining an implementation mechanism which will effectu-
ate the change. It cannot be expected that acquiescence to these pro-
posed major shifts will follow upon identification of a newly recognized
adjudication question. The element of the subconscious, even instinc-
tive, reaction of the experienced trial lawyer will militate against an
easy transition.
Let us make it clear at the outset that we foresee that the strong
guidance of the trial judge will be indispensable to execution, on an
individual case basis, of our suggested shift in orientation. A higher
degree of judicial intervention, at pre-determined stages, respecting
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established points of controversy would be completely consistent with
the role of the judge as a neutral toward the litigating parties. Such
higher visibility and responsibility of the bench in products litigation,
as opposed to its responsibility in other civil actions, need not and would
not be at the expense of any responsibility borne by counsel on either
side of the controversy.
The enhanced role of the trial judge may be played largely within
the framework of established judicial authority. The pre-trial confer-
ence presents the preeminent opportunity to establish the product and
its environment as the focal point of litigation. It is then that plaintiff's
counsel could be compelled to elect his cause of action. The accepted
procedure of drafting the complaint so as to encompass claims sounding
in negligence, warranty, and strict liability may be defensible at the
preliminary stages of litigation; it is not defensible at the stage of
evidentiary presentations to the jury. The presentation of various in-
consistent and partially contradictory theories of recovery, with cor-
responding evidence in support of each, must serve to confound even
the most conscientious juryman.30 The confusion of the theories fosters
an overall aura of defect which may make it difficult to establish a prima
facie case on any of these theories standing alone. If we are to ask the
jury to focus upon product behavior, the trial judge quite properly
adopts and applies a procedure which substantially contains the area of
admissible evidence to that which is ultimately responsive to the issue
of product behavior. The jury should neither be expected nor asked to
sort out a grab bag of evidence, discarding that which is not germane
to product behavior and retaining the remainder for later consideration
and evaluation.
The pre-trial conference also affords the trial judge an opportunity
to evaluate the expert in the context of his personal background, his
anticipated role in this litigation, and the scope of his testimony. Al-
together too much emphasis has been placed on the presence or absence
of paper credentials as the sole determinant of an expert's qualifications.
A judicial pre-trial determination thus serves both to assure a minimum
level of evidentiary presentation and avoidance of irrelevant but poten-
tially misleading foundation testimony. Further, to the extent that the
necessary qualification of the expert is established in conjunction with a
statement of the nature and degree of supporting evidence upon which
the experts' opinion will be brought to bear, the court will be afforded
30. Id. at 1083-85.
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an opportunity to judge the general and specific capacity of the witness
to offer probative evidence and to conclusively pass upon this expert's
capacity to testify on this particular matter.
As indicated earlier, we are attempting to formulate guidelines for
evaluating an expert's ability to speak to the litigated issues. The
mechanisms by which this evaluation can be undertaken are diverse.
While in many instances the court may have the capacity to make these
judgments without outside aid, in other cases the complexity of both
the issues and the requisite expertise may suggest the need for a tech-
nical arm to the court. Although the utility of technical aides to the
court has been the subject of much discussion,"1 this question will be
examined from a different perspective. Our particular focus will be
threefold:
1) To match the expert with the technical issues in the litigation.
2) To aid the court in defining the precise technical issues to be
litigated.
3) To establish minimal levels of evidence, both physical and theo-
retical, for the technical indicia necessary to prove the cause of
action.
Judicial activism also Will be called for in making the difficult deter-
mination regarding the propriety of admitting evidence which has been
ill-preserved or which has been produced through improper testing
procedures which have virtually destroyed the sample itself. In many
instances the compounding of what is at best a difficult technical issue
by requiring its resolution with physical evidence that has been com-
promised may result in resolving an issue by sheer speculation.
There are flagrant inadequacies in the present system for control of
evidence. Steps should be taken by which the judiciary becomes the
agency for controlling the integrity of the real evidence. This may re-
quire post-accident intervention by the judicial system to secure the
evidence. In certain kinds of cases where institutional defendants (e.g.,
industrial) are involved this might be accomplished with relative ease;
and in other kinds of cases the involvement of the law (e.g., police ac-
cident investigation) may provide an appropriate agency for interven-
31. Suggested "neutral expert" procedures, whereby the problems inherent in the use
of the adversarial expert witness might be obviated, have included the following: specialized
juries composed only of experts in the particular technical area to be litigated; use of the
expert as an "aide to the court" who advises the judge on technological matters with no
duties of testimony at trial; and use of a court-appointed expert who has duties at trial
identical to those of the experts called by the adversaries. Id. at 1083.
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tion. When there has been evidence deterioration, however, it may be
necessary for the court to utilize its own staff of experts to inform it as
to the meaningfulness of litigation given such deteriorated real evidence.
The charade of trying complex cases based on physical evidence in an
advanced state of deterioration is a waste of judicial time and con-
tributes little to the advancement of justice.
In those cases where a party has treated evidence in so cavalier a
manner as to destroy his opponent's opportunity to conduct his own
critical evaluations, an exclusionary ruling by the trial judge would
serve to maintain a fair and proper balance between litigants. Such
determinations by trial judges, over a period of time, would lead to the
acceptance of techniques and standards of evidence preservation which
would give promise of a higher quality of litigation.
The trial judge who has been apprised of the nature of the product
and the defects alleged will be in a position at each stage of the trial
to compel parties to focus upon the central questions of product descrip-
tion within its environment and the allegedly deficient aspects of that
product which would permit a conclusion of "legal" defect. The likeli-
hood that the trial court will be ruling blindly, or nearly so, upon
evidentiary questions at a premature stage of the trial's development is
therefore substantially reduced.
A highly structured and fully developed pre-trial proceeding which
accomplishes the goals set forth above can result only if the parties are
forced to sharply define the issues and the method of proof as they see
them prior to the pre-trial hearing. Whatever method is utilized by the
court to accomplish the goals of qualifying the experts and evaluating
the issues and the evidence, they cannot be accomplished in the context
of loose and vague commitments by the parties to their theories of the
case.
At the inception of the trial, the judge will have been provided with
a basis for a preliminary instruction to the jury of the nature and range
of the matters to which the jury will bring its evaluative sense. The pre-
trial activities will have cleared away the irrelevancies of alternative
bases of liability and will have sharply defined within the structure of
strict liability the particular premise of the instant action. The judge
therefore may outline the legal principles of strict liability within the
framework of the kind of suit about to be presented.
Finally, we recognize that in establishing standards for experts and
minimal levels for testing and evaluation of evidence, we are touching
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upon a very difficult problem. It is common knowledge that the level of
expertise and expert investigation varies according to recovery expecta-
tion. It is also clear that many cases in which the anticipated level of
recovery is low the technological problems can be as substantial and
financially demanding as those with a high recovery expectation. These
cases today are often tried in a totally inadequate fashion. There is
usually tacit acquiescence between the parties which realistically con-
trols the expenditures of expert time and effort regarding the matter
to be litigated. The proposals we have set forth would challenge the
litigation of cases below a certain minimum level of competence. Since
the quality of experts and testing would be required to meet a given
standard, the implications of such a conclusion are rather clear. Where
the litigation process is not economically feasible, thought must be given
to alternative systems for the resolution of conflicts.
CONCLUSIONS
The sociological system that has had the greatest impact on man's
interaction with his society is the legal system. And that aspect of the
legal system that deals with the interaction of society with technology
-products liability-provides a model for viewing the importance of
the technologist's role in understanding and providing expert guidance
for the further developments of technology as well as for the legal
system itself.
It is evident that we are in an era of transition. Our society and our
government are both sensitized to the necessity of enhancing the safety
of industry's wares. The new federal agencies for both occupational
safety and product safety, together with the literally hundreds of inde-
pendent consumer groups, are ample evidence of society's concern for
a safer interaction with technology. Out of this ferment will undoubt-
edly emerge a plethora of guidelines, standards, and codes designed
to establish a framework for the production of safer products.
It might well appear that the emergence of these mechanisms of
governmental and private regulation may attenuate the role of the
legal system as the determinant forum for legal liability and economic
responsibility. In fact, these mechanisms, apart from the legal system,
afford an incomplete basis for adjudication of legal and economic
responsibility. Their function is to develop new levels of manufacturer
awareness and consumer acceptability. However, it is ultimately only
462
Vol. 12: 425, 1974
Product Liability
the courts of law which will determine whether these new levels, ex-
ternally established, are the appropriate criteria for the determination
of legal and economic liability in the private sector.3 2
To be explicit, federal and state agencies are now in the process of
developing standards for both consumer and industrial product safety.
The civil lawsuit in products liability stands ready to accomplish an
important function in determining the validity of the standards estab-
lished. When agency standards are brought to the courts in the context
of a product liability suit, the courts will be forced to pass on the
adequacy of governmental standards in deciding the issue of unreason-
able danger. Thus, in passing on the adequacy of product design a court
is free, in a civil suit, to establish a standard either more exacting or
less onerous than the governmental standard.
This power exercised by the courts in a civil lawsuit can provide to
society independent and objective evaluations of the quality of the
standards and ultimately the overall direction of government regulation.
The product will be exposed in its actual use and environment and be
subjected to the evaluation of experts in the context of a real contro-
versy. Consequently, it appears certain that the legal system will be
presented with early and insistent opportunities to employ the criteria
for product safety as crucial elements in the adjudicating process. The
frequent recourse which will be made to these standards as indicators
rather than determinants in the judicial forum gives promise of a
constant refinement of these mechanisms in response to the stringent
testing to which they are to be ultimately subjected in the adjudicatory
process.
32. The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1970), has as its purpose
the protection of the consuming public against unreasonable risks of injury and the
development of uniform safety standards against which a manufacturer's product may be
tested. Criminal and civil penalties may be invoked by the government against a manu-
facturer who fails to comply with the duties and standards promulgated under sections
2069-70 of the Act. The Act also provides that any consumer who sustains injury by rea-
son of a manufacturer's or retailer's knowing violation of a requirement of the Act may
bring suit in federal court for damages (section 2072). It is expressly provided that the
latter remedy under the Act is "in addition to" and not "in lieu of" any other common
law remedy or right conferred under state or federal laws. It is also provided that a
product's compliance with the requirements of the Act shall not relieve the manufacturer
or retailer from liability he may have at common law or under state or federal statute, nor
shall the failure of the Product Safety Commission to designate the product as a sub-
stantial product hazard or ban it in its entirety be admissible in evidence at any litigation
(section 2074). Thus it can be seen that although the Consumer Product Safety Act has
taken solid steps to ensure the protection of the consuming public, it is not a panacea for
all ills arising from hazardous products. Courts of law must of necessity formulate their
decisions in te great majority of cases before them, wherein the alleged defective products
are not touched by the standards of the Consumer Product Safety Act, using the 402A
standards of defect and unreasonable danger.
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However, the additional precision which would seem to be the
inevitable consequence of these developments in the technological field
pose a challenge of fundamental seriousness to the litigation system.
If that system is capable of absorbing this input so as to more accurately
gage the point of legal liability, litigation of private claims will remain
a central testing area of societal needs.
On the other hand, the failure to understand and employ these
mechanisms in a meaningful way in the litigation process will render
the private claim lawsuit an anomaly, without relevance to the questions
supposedly central to the issue of legal liability.
One cannot expect state and federal agencies to respond to judicial
criticism of inadequate or overly harsh standards when the thrust of
the civil lawsuit designed to establish standards is erratic and not
primarily focused on evaluating the product in its environment in order
to establish defect and unreasonable danger. Another result of such a
fossilization will necessarily be the conversion of a strict liability test
into an absolute liability test, with a showing of injury being the only
issue in dispute. Such a liability standard can have only a minimal
effect on industry standards. Finally, if this is the direction in which
society chooses to move, that choice should be made as between possible
alternatives rather than one foisted upon it by the unresponsive nature
of a litigation system. We believe that the legal system is inherently
capable of such adaptation as will demonstrate its viability as a central
forum of determination of society's needs.
We believe, however, that there are serious problems extant in the
form and substance of products liability litigation. It appears that some
of these problems have arisen from the attempt to fit the new theory of
strict liability into the old framework of negligence litigation. The
problems which we have uncovered would seem to be serious enough,
if not solved, to prevent the legal system from being responsive to the
new demands being placed upon it by society. We therefore suggest
that these problems and their solutions must be addressed in order to
permit the legal system to function effectively as society's arbiter.
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